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Towards constructing the governable worker in nineteenth-century Britain 
 
ABSTRACT 
The governable worker, in Britain, is defined by the existing literature as a creation of 
the scientific management movement of the early twentieth century and, within the 
accounting domain, through standard costing as a disciplinary practice. This paper 
studies actions taken by the administrators and managers of Britain’s government 
military manufacturing establishments (GMMEs), from the 1850s onwards, to create a 
more governable workforce. This objective was achieved through the imposition of 
disciplinary practices, most importantly the use of time records to ensure attendance at 
the workplace and expert knowledge-based piece rates to monitor and control labour 
intensity. The absence of scientifically-established labour standards at GMMEs is 
acknowledged but, in other important respects, accounting is shown to have played a 
key role in the formulation of disciplinary practices designed to construct a governable 
labour force some decades before standard costing became the mechanism for 
rendering visible efficiency within the workplace. 
 




Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s first administration (1979-1984) was committed 
to improving the public finances through the elimination of wasteful and unnecessary 
expenditure and the pursuit of efficiency savings. A fundamental problem which needed 
to be overcome to create a ‘lean and more competitive’ public sector capable of 
supplying its citizens with greater value for money was the perceived lack of 
managerialism (Groot & Budding, 2008, p. 2). The phenomenon which became known 
as New Public Management (NPM) was ‘strongly related to the adoption of business-like 
management and accounting instruments’ (van Helden, 2005, p. 9) and, in the years that 
followed, corresponding accounting reforms were introduced in many other countries 
(Christiaens & van Petegham, 2007, p. 375).  
Nineteenth century British government witnessed an earlier emergent interest in the 
pursuit of efficiency and economy in the conduct of public affairs. Leading politicians 
such as Joseph Hume, Sir Henry Parnell and Sir James Graham were influential 
advocates of improved productivity. Hume as the leader of the radical party in 
Parliament has been described as ‘the self-elected guardian of the public purse’ and 
credited with causing the word ‘retrenchment’ to be added to the radical party’s agenda 
of ‘peace and reform’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910, p. 884). Parnell was an 
indefatigable critic of excessive government expenditure both in Parliament and in a 
2 
 
series of publications, the most influential of which was On Financial Reform (Parnell, 
1830). Graham, as First Lord of the Admiralty and overlord of the main spending 
departments, was in a position to employ his ‘brilliant administrative talents’ to help 
put these ideas into action (Ward, 1967: xv). 
More broadly, the changing composition of Parliament was important in 
transforming attitudes towards public expenditure. During the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century the landed aristocracy came under increasing challenge from the 
commercial and industrial classes for control over the nation’s affairs. Perkin (1969, p. 
272) sums things up as follows:  
neither contemporaries nor historians have doubted that the capitalist middle class 
were the ‘real’ rulers of mid-Victorian England, in the sense that the laws which were 
passed and executed by landed Parliaments and Governments were increasingly 
those demanded by the business men.  
The policy objective of such ‘business men’ was to pursue ‘cheap and efficient 
government’ as part of the endeavour to create a ‘society based on capital and 
competition’ (Perkin, 1969, p. 320). The concern to achieve full value for public 
expenditure featured prominently in the deliberations of government-appointed 
committees whose work is recognised in this paper with, for example, the terms of 
reference of the Select Committee on Military Organization (BPP 1860 (441), p. iii, 
emphasis added) comprising the obligation ‘to inquire whether any Changes are 
required to secure the utmost Efficiency and Economy in the Administration of Military 
Affairs’. The introduction of the commercial system of double entry to supply a better 
system of financial control and accountability in response to these concerns is well 
documented (Edwards & Greener, 2003; Funnell et al., 2016). This paper focuses on the 
use of new ways of accounting to help minimise production costs in the British 
government’s military manufacturing establishments (GMMEs).  
Consistent with the nineteenth-century political philosophy of laissez-faire, however, 
many influential politicians and bureaucrats believed that the manufacture of 
armaments should best be left to the ‘private trade’ as revealed, for example, in the 
House of Commons debate on ‘Government Manufacturing Establishments’ on 22 July 
1864 (Hansard, vol. 176, cols 1907-1977). British industrialists were also, of course, 
keen to maintain such an arrangement. The case for the government taking a degree of 
control over weapon manufacture came from military personnel on grounds of cost and 
reliability of supply (Edwards, 2015, pp. 418-420). The initial, compromise solution was 
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to employ both sources of supply with the GMMEs weaponry costs of production also 
serving as ‘a check upon the price of contractors’ (BPP 1854 (236), p. x).  
The senior managers of GMMEs were invariably military men, and their preference 
for the in-house supply of armaments provided a clear incentive to drive down 
production costs and develop reporting practices which showed them to be least-cost 
suppliers of weaponry required by the state (Edwards, 2015).1 In 1858, for example, the 
Superintendent of the Royal Small Arms Factory [RSAF] at Enfield Lock, Colonel William 
Manley Hall Dixon, and its chief engineer, James Henry Burton,2 devised a financial 
report for presentation to Parliament which showed ‘profit’ as ‘the difference between 
the cost price of the Arms [manufactured at the RSAF] and the price at which they could 
be purchased from the Trade’ (Burton Papers, 1858, February 24). Dixon informed the 
1860 Select Committee on Military Organization that ‘a saving to the Government of 
93,920l. 14s. 5d’ had been made ‘as contrasted with the present price of the same rifle 
made in the trade’ at Birmingham and London (BPP 1860 (441), q. 5538). It 
subsequently became standard practice to make annual returns to parliament which (i) 
provided a detailed build-up of the unit cost of every item manufactured at GMMEs, and 
(ii) revealed savings on armaments which could, alternatively, be acquired from the 
business sector (e.g. BPP 1864 (392), pp. 73-74, p. 76). 
These financial reports were not used, however, to manage the labour force, and the 
research question addressed in this study is the extent to which the administrators and 
managers of Britain’s GMMEs created a governable workforce through the imposition of 
                                                          
1 Concern with the efficiency and effectiveness of the government’s operations was by 
no means confined to GMMEs. Sir Charles Trevelyan, who (with Stafford Northcote) is 
famous for advocating the introduction of competitive examinations as the meritocratic 
basis for admission to the civil services, wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, W.E. 
Gladstone in 1854, urging radical reform of the civil service designed to make ‘the 
Treasury really a supervising Office, possessed of a firm hold of all the branches of 
business which it had to deal with’ (Trevelyan to Gladstone, quoted in Hughes, 1949, p. 
55). As Trevelyan put it in 1850, his aim was that the working of departments should be 
watched over by the Treasury ‘as a master-manufacturer watches his machinery’ (BPP 
1854-1855 (1870), p. 433).  
2 Burton was recruited from Harpers Ferry, Virginia, to manage the installation and 
operation at the RSAF of machinery acquired from the United States (Lewis, 1996, p. 23, 
p. 340; Tate 2006, pp. 106-107). As shown in section 3, below, mass production and 
assembly-line techniques were disseminated from American to Britain around this time 




a range of disciplinary procedures as theorised by Michel Foucault (see section 2). We 
will see that the catalyst for the introduction of procedures capable of achieving better 
control over labour was changes in workplace practices associated with adoption of a 
technological phenomenon known as ‘the American system of manufacturing’3 
(Chandler, 1977, p. 75) developed at the Springfield Armory, Massachusetts and 
Harpers Ferry, Virginia during the first half of the nineteenth century.4 Hoskin and 
Macve (1988) attribute the genesis of managerialism, based on the use of accounting to 
achieve more intensive utilisation of the workforce, to a series of events at the former of 
these two government armories in the 1830s and 1840s. In Britain, corresponding 
arrangements awaited the scientific management era, with the premium and piece-rate 
arrangements operated at Boulton & Watt from about 1795 onwards dismissed by 
Fleischman, Hoskin and Macve (1995, p. 171, p. 174; cf. Toms & Fleischman, 2015) as an 
imprecise, ‘one-off’ exercise. This paper will show, however, that the formulation of 
piece rates based on careful empirical study was instrumental in achieving, within 
GMMEs, more intensive utilisation of the labour force from the middle of the nineteenth 
century onwards. As a result, management assumed a greater degree of direct 
responsibility for controlling the labour force though not, perhaps, in the overtly 
‘scientific’ and intrusive fashion associated with Taylorism (Kanigel, 1997).  
The GMMEs studied in this paper comprise the RSAF at Enfield Lock, the Royal 
Gunpowder Factory, Waltham Abbey and the following three establishments located at 
the Royal Arsenal in Woolwich: the Royal Laboratory; the Royal Carriage Department; 
and the Royal Gun Factory. The time-frame covered by this paper is 1851, when the 
Great Exhibition provided a forum which brought to the attention of the British public 
major American advances in production technology, and 1887 when evidence 
presented to the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Organization and 
Administration of the Manufacturing Departments of the Army clarified the extent to 
which GMMEs employed piece-rate accounting to help construct a more governable 
person. The GMMEs undertook substantial manufacturing operations with Table 1 
                                                          
3 This term contrasts with the earlier English system of manufacturing discussed in 
section 4. 
4 Paradoxically features of this system were devised by Marc Isambard Brunel (father of 
the even more famous Isambard Kingdom Brunel) for the manufacture of pulley blocks 
at the Portsmouth dockyards in about 1803 (Lewis 1996, p. 19; see also p. 311). 
Whether any debt is owed to Brunel from American engineers is unclear. 
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providing employment and expenditure statistics for each of them for the accounting 
years 1870-1871 and 1885-1886. Further signals of the size of their operations are 
provided by the knowledge that output in 1885-1886 included 59,930 rifles at the RSAF, 
383 rifled muzzle-loading and breech-loading heavy guns at the Royal Gun Factory, and 
60,953,739 cartridges at the Royal Laboratory (BPP 1887 (254), pp. 69-70, p. 120, p. 
150, p. 164). 
Table 1.  




Wages (£)5 Total 
departmental 
expenditure (£) 
Royal Small Arms Factory Enfield Lock    
1870-1871 2,110 189,022 258,541 
1885-1886 2,079 197,086 286,082 
Royal Gunpowder Factory Waltham Abbey    
1870-1871 157 10,552 18,013 
1885-1886 374 26,939 81,361 
Royal Carriage Department Woolwich    
1870-1871 1,382 111,034 148,309 
1885-1886 2,061 221,262 388,681 
Royal Gun Factory Woolwich    
1870-1871 903 79,871 203,984 
1885-1886 1,834 192,932 453,054 
Royal Laboratory Woolwich    
1870-1871 2,674 152,683 309,763 
1885-1886 5,694 451,454 922,326 
 
The principal primary resources used to conduct this study are House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers6 which are available electronically7 and comprise thousands of 
files that can be interrogated employing keywords relevant to the research question 
under investigation. Of particular importance is evidence taken before government 
committees which supplies a record of what accounting practices were followed and 
why they had been (or should be) adopted. Further, the examination and cross-
                                                          
5 £ s. d. are abbreviations for the words pounds (sterling), shillings and pence which 
described the pre-decimalisation (15 February 1971) currency in Britain. There were 
12 ‘old’ pence (d.) in a shilling (s.) and 20 shillings in a pound (£). 
6 So far as I am aware none of the relevant accounting records of GMMEs have survived 
from the period studied in this paper. 
7 Chadwyck Healey’s collection of House of Commons Parliamentary Papers can be 
accessed at: http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk. 
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examination of witnesses8 reveals insights to the mentalities behind choices made that, 
typically, are absent from the surviving archives of businesses operating in the private 
sector. A limitation of this study is the unavoidable reliance on official sources which 
produces the risk of a history reflecting the views of the ‘dominant group’ (Hammond & 
Streeter, 1994, p. 272), i.e. the opinions of civil servants associated with GMMEs and the 
various layers of management within those institutions, rather than the rank and file 
working at those locations. The ‘new accounting history’ has given a stronger voice, 
often through oral history studies, to individuals and groups that more traditional 
histories are inclined to overlook. Such a possibility is unavailable for studies located 
prior to existing living memory, as is the case here.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The notion of the governable 
worker as the conceptual guidance for this paper is first explained. Next, the study is 
contextualised by (i) examining the transfer to the RSAF at Enfield Lock of a 
technological phenomenon labelled ‘the American system of manufacturing’ (Chandler, 
1977, p. 75), and (ii) studying the widespread use of piece-rate based remuneration in 
Britain and, latterly, its role in the transition from ‘extensive’ to ‘intensive’ utilisation of 
the workforce (Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 356). The construction of a system of expert 
knowledge-based piece rates designed to create a governable workforce within Britain’s 
GMMEs is next studied. This is followed by a review of the accounting procedures 
employed to better depict human visibility in written form, and the further cost-cutting 
initiatives mounted to address the government’s growing concern with efficiency and 
economy within the public domain. Concluding remarks are then presented. 
 
2. The governable worker 
The theoretical lens for viewing events at GMMEs in the second half of the nineteenth 
century is provided by Michel Foucault’s Discipline and punish9 wherein he explains how 
                                                          
8 The government committees whose work is studied in this paper might be composed 
entirely of members of parliament (i.e. a select committee) or might include people 
from outside Westminster with expert knowledge of the issues under investigation. The 
members of the committees (usually about a dozen) then decided which people (e.g. 
managers of GMMEs) might help them answer their remit. Such ‘witnesses’ would be 
asked for their views and opinions on particular issues and were the subject of 
interrogation designed to investigate further the validity of their evidence.  
9 Originally published in 1975, the English-language edition translated by Alan Sheridan 
and issued by Penguin Books in 1991 is cited here. 
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disciplinary power achieves ‘the submission of bodies through the control of ideas’ 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 102). That is, it transforms undisciplined and independently minded 
individuals (e.g. soldiers, prisoners and workers) into ‘docile bodies’ that can be 
managed and improved (Foucault, 1991, p. 135). Discipline and punish, despite its 
subtitle The birth of the prison, is not a study of the management of a particular 
institution but of the nature and operation of a disciplinary technology. Foucault’s 
theory of the emergence of a disciplinary society ‘has been rehearsed many times in the 
accounting literature’ (Walker, 2010, p. 630) and, in this section, it is sufficient to 
recount key tenets of Discipline and punish to provide a framework for the study of piece 
work arrangements at Britain’s GMMEs before moving on to review accounting history 
literature that exploits his ideas. 
 
Discipline and punish 
The first point to make, and it is one which is pertinent in the context of the present 
study, is that Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power focuses on the individual not the 
group: ‘Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, [disciplinary 
power] separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to 
the point of necessary and sufficient single units’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 170). But while 
Foucault (1991, p. 187) insists that ‘It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able 
always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection’, such 
individuals are not necessarily expected to play an entirely passive role in the exercise 
of disciplinary power. Instead, it is a ‘form of power [that] augmented human capacities 
rather than repressed them’ (Armstrong, 1994, p. 28). Further, each person is an active 
participant in reinventing himself: ‘Discipline “makes” individuals; it is the specific 
technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its 
exercise’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 170). This paper nevertheless reveals evidence of friction 
between the managers and those managed in the pursuit of greater efficiency within the 
workplace. 
The success of disciplinary power in creating the governable person is attributed to 
the ‘use of simple instruments; hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and 
their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination’ (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 170). Hierarchical observation consists of ‘an apparatus in which the techniques that 
make it possible to see induce effects of power’ and transform behaviour (Foucault, 
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1991, p. 171). Such apparatus might be architectural and ‘act on those it shelters, to 
provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effect of power right to them, to make it 
possible to know them, to alter them’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 172). Here Foucault cites the 
architecture of the Oberkampf manufactory at Jouy-en-Josas, constructed in 1791 (i.e. at 
the naissance of the disciplinary era), as an excellent example of the creation of 
disciplinary space. Features of construction designed to facilitate the ‘disciplinary gaze’ 
of factory supervisors included: a building 110 metres long and three stories high; 
production arranged in two parallel rows running the length of the building; and 
successive stages of production grouped together. Consequently, by ‘walking up and 
down the central aisle of the workshop, it was possible to carry out supervision that was 
both general and individual’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 145). There is no discussion of the 
presence of written records at Oberkampf but, quite clearly, supervisors could ‘observe 
the workers presence and application, and the quality of his work; to compare workers 
with one another; to classify them according to skill and speed’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 145). 
On the need to move beyond the architectural to engage with non-visual forms of 
surveillance, Foucault again turns briefly away from the prisons, workhouses, hospitals 
and schools that are the principal foci of his work (Grey, 1994; Walker, 2010, p. 638). 
The need for a new way of creating visibility is acknowledged by Foucault (1991, p. 
174) as ‘the problem of the workshops and factories in which a new type of surveillance 
was organized’. There, he recognises that, as ‘the machinery of production became 
larger and more complex, as the number of workers and the division of labour 
increased, supervision became ever more necessary and difficult’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 
174). The need for ‘an intense, continuous supervision’ of the labour process, which 
‘took into account the activity of the men, their skill, the way they set about their tasks, 
their promptness, their zeal, their behaviour’ was supplied by a phalanx of ‘clerks, 
supervisors and foremen’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 174). Foucault goes into no detail about 
how this was to be achieved within workshops and factories but, of course, there was no 
need for him to do so. His main focus was elsewhere, but the above comments make 
clear the fact that the basic principles expounded in Discipline and punish were intended 
for general application. 
Different forms of surveillance – both direct and indirect –therefore provide the basis 
for Foucault’s normalizing judgements but it is the latter – the depiction of human 
selves in written form – that is the major focus of Discipline and punish. There, 
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disciplinary power ‘brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual 
actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the 
principle of a rule to be followed. … In short, it normalizes’ (Foucault, 1991, pp. 182-
183). Foucault’s work does not focus upon accountancy per se, but he does engage with 
the language of the accountant when discussing the measurement of performance 
(Walker, 2010, p. 630). On the range of numerical observations that might be collected 
with the aim of normalising behaviour, Foucault (1991, p. 180) comments: ‘Moreover, it 
is possible to quantify this field and work out an arithmetical economy based on it. A 
penal accountancy, constantly brought up to date, makes it possible to obtain the 
punitive balance-sheet of each individual’. The basis for normalising judgements is 
therefore provided by the examination which places individuals in a field of surveillance 
[and] also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of 
documents that capture and fix them’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 189). The examination 
therefore provides a different and, around 1800, a new type of visibility of the actions of 
an observed population though, importantly, obtained through invisible means.  
The ‘penal accountancy’ identifies deviations from the norm and, where negative, 
‘Disciplinary punishment’ is designed to reduce gaps and fulfil an ‘essentially corrective’ 
function (Foucault, 1991, p. 179). But ‘Disciplinary punishment is, in the main, 
isomorphic with obligation itself; it is not so much the vengeance of an outraged law’, as 
exercised in the era of sovereign power, and ‘the corrective effect expected of it involves 
only incidentally expiation and repentance; it is obtained directly through the 
mechanics of training. To punish is to exercise’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 179). Punishment, 
whatever form it takes, is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to encourage compliance 
and, for this reason, there was put in place a system of rewards as well as punishment.  
These, then, are the themes which frame this study of workplace and accounting 
practices introduced at Britain’s GMMEs during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Given the well-known independent-mindedness of factory Superintendents – 
all military men – who ran each of the five institutions as if their own personal fiefdoms, 
and the fact that quite different instruments of warfare were manufactured at each 
location, organisational arrangements differed a great deal. We nevertheless find ample 
evidence of steps taken to ensure that workers were ‘constantly seen’ by management 
through both direct observation and measurement practices. It will also become evident 
that the piece rates fulfilled a dual function by bestowing financial reward on the 
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disciplined worker and punishment, through lower wages, on those whose output fell 
below expected norms. It is also argued that expert knowledge-based piece rates 
fulfilled a ‘corrective’ role in the creation of ‘docile bodies’ and that workers, through 
observation of how they and their colleagues were treated, participated in their own 
subjugation. It will also be revealed, however, that the actions of workers did not always 
display passive submission to the demands placed upon them by the dominant group. In 
particular, we will see that GMME workers indulged in game-playing designed to 
challenge the piece-rate as an effective disciplinary mechanism.  
The arrangements put in place at Britain’s GMMEs in the endeavour to create ‘docile 
bodies’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 135) which could be managed and improved are studied in 
sections 3-6. First, however, important case studies of the way in which Foucault’s ideas 
have already been exploited to theorise labour management practices are reviewed. 
 
Foucault in accounting history  
An early issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting states that Foucault’s theories 
‘have had a profound effect on science, and accounting thought in particular’ (Cooper & 
Tinker, 1994, p. 1). In the accounting arena Cooper and Tinker reflect on a spate of 
articles, beginning in the early 1980s, which drew on Foucault’s ideas and those of other 
postmodern philosophers ‘to situate accounting in the world of lived experience as both 
a product of social construction and as an architect of social experience’ (Neimark, 
1990, p. 106). As Armstrong (1994, p. 26) predicted, Foucauldian theories have since 
continued to provide inspiration for much academic research. 
Foucault’s disciplinary technology gained a degree of adoption in the eighteenth 
century and was applied ‘with a vengeance’ to institutions in the nineteenth century 
(Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1986, p. 153). Research has revealed accounting in a range of 
disparate guises as an apparatus ‘imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in 
the hope of producing certain desired effects’ (Rose, 1990, p. 52). Confining attention to 
the subject of the present paper, i.e. the business world, there are a number of prior 
contributions to the literature which employ a Foucauldian framework to help 
understand how accounting, as a disciplinary technique which renders the actions of 
workers visible and calculable, succeeds in changing their behaviour to better achieve 
managerial objectives. Four publications, in particular (Carmona et al., 2002; Walsh & 
Stewart, 1993; Miller & O’Leary 1987; Hoskin & Macve, 1988), serve as helpful sources 
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for understanding the purpose, contribution and limitations of the present study. They 
focus on the use of accounting to govern the behaviour of factory workers in three 
different countries – Spain, the United States and Britain. It should be made clear that 
the purpose of this paper is not to rank the Spanish Royal Tobacco Factory, the 
Springfield Armory, the New Lanark Cotton Factory and Britain’s GMMEs in terms of 
whether arrangements fully reflect the Foucauldian concept of disciplinary power. 
Equally there is no concern here to judge which of the arrangements was most 
successful in achieving effective management of the labour force. The prior literature is 
important because it shows that at different times and in different places the 
procedures articulated and theorised by Foucault emerged as part of the endeavour to 
create a more docile, manageable and efficient workforce.  
The Spanish Royal Tobacco Factory has proved a particularly fruitful site for the 
study of accounting as a disciplinary practice, Carmona et al. (2002) examine new 
arrangements put in place when the city of Seville moved the production of tobacco 
from the San Pedro Factory to the New Factories in 1758. They show how ‘the 
intertwining of accounting and spatial practices provide discipline in the factory by 
yielding calculable spaces and accountable subjects’ (Carmona et al., 2002, p. 239). 
Central to their story is the creation of ‘docile bodies’ through the demarcation of space 
based on ‘enclosure, partitioning, coding and the rank’ (Carmona et al., 2002, p. 243). 
Fúnez’ (2005) further studies the disciplinary character of the accounting practices 
adopted at the Royal Tobacco Factory with a specific focus on the period 1761 to 1790. 
A pioneering application of Foucault’s ideas in the endeavour to gain a better 
understanding of factory-based management is Hoskin and Macve’s (1988) study of 
events at the Springfield Armory, Massachusetts in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century. It is a paper that should also be introduced at this stage because, as we shall 
see, certain production and work practices employed at the Springfield Armory were 
transmitted to Britain’s GMMEs in the 1850s. Hoskin and Macve (1988) believe that 
they locate the genesis of managerialism at the Springfield Armory, and they attribute 
this breakthrough to the work of the Army Inspector of Contract Arms, Daniel Tyler. It 
was Tyler who, in their estimation, made calculable the performance of individual 
workers based on time and motion studies undertaken ‘watch in hand’ over a six month 
period in 1831-1832 (Hoskin, 2004, p. 747). This enabled Tyler ‘to impose a new way of 
seeing each individual worker in terms of norms and deviations from the norm’ 
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(Ezzamel et al., 1990, p. 159) and, as a result, the power of disciplinarity penetrated the 
workplace in a manner which created ‘both financial and human accountability’ (Hoskin 
& Macve, 1988, p. 43).10  
Turning to British accounting history, Walsh and Stewart (1993) studied the 
accounting records at two sites separated by about a century – the New Mills Woollen 
Manufactory 1681-1703 and the New Lanark Cotton Factory 1800-1812 – to adduce 
evidence of the changing role of accounting for labour. They discern remarkable 
differences. At New Mills, where ‘Customary rates were paid to piece workers’ (Walsh & 
Stewart, 1993, p. 785), they see accounting confined to a record of market transactions. 
At New Lanark, however, they detect a ‘very different notion of government’ which 
‘embrace[d] a series of techniques of inspection’ that enabled management to modify 
behaviour through knowledge (Walsh & Stewart, 1993, p. 787, p. 789).  
Moving forward in time a 100 or so years, Miller and O’Leary (1987) locate the 
creation of the governable worker, in Britain, as part of the scientific management 
movement, often referred to as Taylorism.11 Miller and O’Leary (1987, p. 241) reveal 
how standard costing, as part of the quest for scientific management that gained 
momentum during the first three decades of the twentieth century, took cost accounting 
to a new level by rendering visible the efficiencies of individuals within an enterprise.  
The present paper is temporally located midway between the latter two British-
based studies. The degree of governability through accounting detected at Britain’s 
GMMEs, commencing in the 1850s, is certainly less intrusive than that which Miller and 
O’Leary (1987) show to have emerged in the era of scientific management. 
Nevertheless, it will be revealed that the system of piece-rate accounting introduced at 
GMMEs rendered ‘visible’, through the use of norms (the hourly rate) and standards 
(the piece rate), as with standard costing, ‘certain crucial aspects of the functioning’ of 
these enterprises (Miller & O’Leary, 1987, p. 239). The conclusion reached, therefore, is 
that an important episode in the creation of a governable worker in Britain remained 
unrecognised when Miller and O’Leary (1987, p. 239) claimed that ‘[i]n the nineteenth 
                                                          
10 The extent to which Tyler’s innovations represented a major discontinuity in labour 
management has been challenged by Tyson (1993). 
11 The term scientific management was coined by Louis Brandeis when presenting 
evidence before the US Interstate Commerce Commission in 1910. Frederick Winslow 
Taylor, who had previously used the term ‘shop management’, titled his 1911 text: The 
principles of scientific management. 
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century discipline within the enterprise took the form of direct confrontations between 
the worker and the boss’. However, as in the case of standard costing systems, we will 
see that skirmishes arose when establishing and revising norms and standards of 
performance.  
The present paper therefore broadens our understanding of the construction of the 
governable worker in Britain through a system of factory surveillance that ranged from 
the architectural and organizational to new ways of doing accounting through the use of 
detailed time records and carefully-constructed piece rates to monitor and control 
labour intensity. As with the system of standard costing that grew out of the scientific 
management movement, this paper will reveal the use of accounting records, in addition 
to direct observation, as the basis for management surveillance of the workforce and, 
thereby, the movement towards ‘managing by the numbers’ (Geneen & Moscow, 1984; 
Ezzamel et al., 1990, p. 161). As with Walsh and Stewart (1987, p. 784) ‘Our main 
argument is that accounting was intertwined with the emergence of the factory rather 
than a neutral technique awaiting changes in user needs which were correlated with the 
Industrial Revolution’. 
The next two sections locate this study within its time-specific historical context. The 
first charts the events which led to the introduction, at the RSAF in the 1850s, of a 
technological phenomenon known as the ‘American system of manufacturing’ 
(Chandler, 1977, p. 75). 
 
3. Mass production and Assembly-line techniques 
In a 60-year period commencing 1839 the United States share of world 
manufacturing output rose from 17 per cent to 53 per cent (Gallman, 1960, p. 26). An 
important driver for this astounding growth-rate was the so-called ‘American system of 
manufacturing’. The mass production of large numbers of standardised goods, such as 
textile products, was a feature of the early days of the British industrial revolution. The 
‘American system of manufacturing’, which enabled the mass production of goods by 
employing largely unskilled labour working with standardized designs, self-acting 
machinery and assembly-line techniques, was something entirely different. 
The potential of the new system was brought to the attention of the British public at 
the Great Exhibition held in Hyde Park in 1851. The purpose of the Exhibition was to 
enable British industrialists to show off their wares to the world and to serve as ‘a 
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visible expression of the country’s economic might’ (Daunton, 2000, p. 73). It is 
therefore ironic that the exhibition also provided a platform for US manufacturers to 
startle ‘[l]eading English engineers and military men’ with products, particularly guns, 
which reflected engagement with ‘revolutionary production methods’ (Best, 1990, p. 
30). Samuel Colt, proprietor of the US-based Patent Arms Manufacturing Company, 
astounded the audience when he ‘put his revolvers on display and demonstrated the 
interchangeability of parts by dissembling a number of pistols, jumbling the parts and 
then reassembling them into workable revolvers once again’ (McNeill, 1982, pp. 233-
234; see also Rosenberg, 1969, pp. 15-18). Perhaps encouraged by this interest, Colt 
opened a factory on the River Thames at Pimlico. A fact-finding visit to Colt’s factory 
made an indelible impression on Lieutenant Colonel Tulloh, Inspector of the Royal 
Carriage Department:  
it was something so different from anything I expected, and so beautiful … The 
consecutive arrangements of the machinery were such as I have never seen in any 
department before. There were, I think, about 150 machines at work, and those 
machines were all placed in a kind of consecutive arrangement to produce a pistol … 
It seemed to be a kind of stream of work flowing through the manufactory in 
consecutive order (BPP 1854 (236), q. 413). 
Colt’s machine-intensive manufacturing process, in contrast with the handicraft 
methods still practised by British gunmakers in their small workshops, required 
production to be broken down into its constituent elements. This yielded a range of 
important benefits that included reduced reliance on skilled labour, increased precision, 
and interchangeable parts.12 This latter virtue was of particular interest to militarists as 
it meant that an army could go into battle with a store of suitable spares rather than 
having to rely on the availability, in the field, of skilled workmen to repair damaged 
guns and artillery (Rosenberg, 1969, pp. 46-47). 
Impressed by these possibilities, and citing the unreliability of the private trade as a 
supplier of weaponry, the Board of Ordnance gained permission to ‘erect a Government 
establishment capable of producing muskets in large numbers, and at a moderate price, 
by the introduction of machinery into every part of the manufacture where it was 
applicable’ (BPP 1854-1855 (0.11), p. 1). A Committee on the Machinery of the United 
States was set up with the authority to purchase appropriate equipment. The 
                                                          
12 Interchangeable parts are components made to strict specifications so that they are 
nearly identical and will fit into any assembled product, e.g. a rifle, of the same type. 
15 
 
Committee visited a number of the ‘best Government and private establishments’ 
including the Springfield Armory and Sharpe’s Rifle Manufacturing Company, Hartford. 
It was provided with every facility to carry out its work. At Springfield, for example, 
Superintendent Colonel Ripley gave them full access to information concerning the 
Armory’ operations, while one of its clerks, a Mr Allen, made available ‘a number of 
valuable papers describing the method on which book-keeping, &c., was there 
conducted’ (BPP 1854-1855 (0.11), p. 22).  
The radical character of innovations subsequently introduced at the RSAF in the late-
1850s can best be appreciated in contrast to the prevailing manufacturing 
arrangements within the craft engineering workshops13 of the private sector, which 
themselves reflected the wider industrial scene as described by Daunton (2000, p. 74): 
‘The industrial economy of nineteenth-century Britain was highly fragmented, 
dominated by small units in the hands of families and partnerships, with a low level of 
integration between different stages of production’.  
The introduction of the American-style techniques of mass production at the RSAF 
required complete reorganisation of the gun making facility in a newly-constructed 
machine shop (Fig. 1). This included ‘one large room’ of 180 feet by 500 feet (Pam, 
1998, p. 47) where machinery was aligned in a series of neat rows (Fig. 2) so as 
to have everything connected with it [production] passing consecutively on from one 
stage to another, never passing over the same ground twice, so that the raw materials 
which go in at one side shall come out a finished musket at the other (Anderson, BPP 
1854 (236), q. 348). 
The significance of these arrangements for the creation of ‘docile bodies’ in a 
Foucauldian sense is next considered. 
 
3.1. Docile bodies 
The creation of docile bodies involves ‘the art of distributions’ whereby, according to 
Foucault (1991, p. 141), ‘discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in 
space’, with a range of techniques employed to achieve that outcome (Carmona et al., 
2002, p. 243). First there is often the need for enclosure which, for production purposes, 
comprises ‘great manufacturing spaces, both homogeneous and well defined’ (Foucault, 
                                                          
13 A factory (in contrast to a domestic) workshop was typically a room or small 
establishment where individuals employed hand-based (handicraft) skills to 
produce a particular article using tools made available for their use  
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1991, p. 142) with, for example, the Royal Arsenal exemplifying this condition through 
occupation of a secure area adjacent to the south bank of the River Thames in Woolwich 
which was accessed through the Beresford Gate built in 1828. The creation of an 
enclosed space of this character was designed ‘to protect materials and tools and to 
master [i.e. discipline] the labour force’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 142). To make enclosure an 
effective disciplinary instrument, a system of partitioning is required so that ‘each 
individual has his own place; and each place its individual’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 143). The 
replacement of workshops, where groups of individuals cooperated in an informal 
manner to produce a product, by assembly line techniques, where each individual is 
charged with responsibility for performing a clearly identifiable function, enables the 
imposition of discipline based on a created, analytical space.  
The third element in the art of distributions is the construction of functional sites: 
‘The rule of functional sites would gradually, in the disciplinary institutions, code a space 
that architecture generally left at the disposal of several different uses’ (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 143). In the case of factories, this required the distribution of individuals to ‘a space in 
which one might isolate and map them’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 144). What Foucault terms 
‘useful’ spaces were therefore constructed for purposes of supervision, measurement 
and control. Fourthly, there is the concept of rank whose significance (Foucault, 1991, p. 
145) emerges from the fact that ‘In discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since 
each is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap that separates it from 
others’. Foucault discusses this concept of rank principally in the context of 
performance in the classroom based on marks achieved, but the use of expert 
knowledge-based piece rates as a disciplinary technology for purposes of supervision 
and reward follows the same principles. The creation of docile bodies is therefore based 
on a complex array of socially constructed practices which enable constant surveillance 
of performance in the workplace. 
One might reasonably imagine that workplace arrangements and practices central to 
the thinking of GMMEs managers, as epitomised by the design and construction of the 
RSAF’s machine shop, supplied supervisors with the kind of disciplinary gaze that 
Foucault associated with the Oberkampf factory built just south of Paris over 60 years 
earlier. Certainly this appears to have been the intention of the Board of Ordnance when 
instructions for the construction of the machine shop were issued. These insisted, as a 
first priority, that the machine shop should be designed ‘on those principles by which 
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the greatest economy and easiest supervision of labour are secured’ (1854 (236), q. 418, 
emphasis added). Fig. 2 reveals that the assembly line was not however automated, so 
that ‘the time taken for any particular job was governed by the speed of the worker’ 
(Pam, 1998, p. 58). Thus the labour force was not yet subordinated to the ‘yoke of the 
machine’ (Braverman, 1974, p. 231) and management instead relied on piece-rate based 
remuneration to provide the incentive for employees to work as quickly as possible.  
The division of manufacturing activities into a series of identifiable tasks is 
particularly well-suited to payment by the ‘piece’, and the next section reviews the role 
of piece-rate based remuneration to discipline and achieve intensive utilisation of the 
GMMEs workforce. 
 
4. Piece rates, discipline and the control of labour 
The piece-rate method of worker remuneration was used in Britain as early as the 
15th century, and it flourished during the 17th and 18th centuries. Under the so-called 
domestic system, the piece of work, e.g. a woman spinning yarn, was performed in the 
home on behalf of the merchant capitalist who supplied the materials. As far as the 
merchant capitalist was concerned it did not matter how quickly or flawlessly the work 
was done. For example, the textile merchant paid an agreed price for each yard of yarn 
only when complete and conforming to quality requirements. It was also a convenient 
arrangement for the worker: the mother spinning yarn in the home was able to look 
after her children while, perhaps, her partner laboured in the fields.  
A new way of organising production known as the English system of manufacturing 
was created during the industrial revolution. By bringing workers together in a factory 
they could become the subject of supervision, thereby enabling the capitalist to achieve, 
in theory, ‘control of [the rate of] production as well as control of the [quality of the] 
product’ (Jones, 1995, p. 16). This potential for some time remained unfulfilled, perhaps 
due to managerial shortcomings and certainly because the workforce was ‘[un]attuned 
to the levels of speed, regularity and direct supervision’ which the pursuit of increased 
governability entailed (Wilson, 1995, p. 32), i.e. workers were simply not yet amenable 
to a regime of disciplinarity in the Foucauldian sense. To minimise friction between 
management and worker a type of piece-rate remuneration called ‘sub-contracting’ or 
‘inside contracting’ was devised. The sub-contractor or piece-master was paid an agreed 
sum of money for a pre-arranged quantity of completed goods. The piece-master’s profit 
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was the difference between the agreed lump sum and the amount paid to members of 
his team. This was an arrangement that transferred managerial responsibilities from 
the capitalist to the piece-master, but also a share of the profit. It has been described as 
‘co-exploitation’ and represented ‘a transitional stage in the development of capitalist 
management’ (Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 297, p. 298). Using the textile industry as an 
exemplar, Daunton (2000, p. 75) explains how the system helped mill owners to 
maximise profits and, at the same time, avoid strikes: 
On each set of mule spindles, a male adult ‘minder’ engaged two junior assistants or 
piecers. The minder was paid according to the output of the machines, so that he had 
an incentive to run them as quickly and efficiently as possible. He was responsible for 
disciplining and paying the piecers on a time rate, so he stood to gain from the 
increased pace of work. The employer could therefore leave labour recruitment and 
discipline to the minders.  
There was of course the possibility of remunerating workers based on time spent in 
the factory and, although by no means absent from workplace arrangements, suffered 
from the drawback that close supervision was required to ensure workers did not shirk 
their duties in terms of the amount of time for which they worked or the extent of their 
effort when working.  
A third possibility was to remunerate individual factory workers, directly, based on 
completed pieces of work as had been the way of things under the domestic system. 
Piece-rate remuneration provided an apparent incentive for workers to maximise 
output and was employed in a manner capable of achieving either ‘extensive’ or 
‘intensive’ utilization of labour (Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 356). Extensive engagement of 
labour was the strategy widely adopted by managers in Britain up to at least the middle 
of the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm, 1964, chapter 17); labour was cheap and in 
plentiful supply, and management simply increased the number of hours worked or the 
number of workers employed as and when required. Hobsbawm’s authoritative study of 
‘Labouring men’ in Britain produced the conclusion that employers ‘neglected the 
problem of labour management almost completely’ because ‘few entrepreneurs realized 
the potential economies of really efficient labour exploitation’, instead considering 
mechanisation a much more important way of improving efficiency and profit 
(Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 352 and p. 354). Where piece rates were in force, they were 
usually fixed by custom, as at the New Mills Woollen Manufactory (Walsh & Stewart, 
1993, p. 785), and, if management wished to seek an increase in profits by reducing 
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labour costs, it did so by making employees work longer hours or by cutting the day rate 
or the piece rate.  
The ‘intensive utilisation’ of the workforce, in contrast, implies implementation by 
management of explicit strategies designed to deploy human resources more efficiently. 
This priority may emerge either because labour is in limited supply or because 
management becomes more highly committed to profit maximisation. The incentive to 
construct a more productive labour force also increases with the degree of 
mechanisation so as to minimize overhead costs per unit. It is likely that GMMEs were a 
more amenable arena for the introduction and operation of disciplinary procedures 
capable of achieving greater labour intensity than was the business sector in mid-
nineteenth century Britain. This was because, as Colonel Arbuthnot put it, ‘a 
government factory can enforce discipline more than a private-one’ (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), q. 7136, q. 7139). Similarly, Brigadier-General Anderson observed: ‘it is most 
certainly useful for discipline’ to have departments headed up by military personnel 
(BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 39) because ‘a military’ man, unlike a civilian, ‘is brought up with 
notions of discipline and authority’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 7134).  
The status accorded to discipline is made crystal-clear in employment protocols. For 
example, Regulation XXVII ‘affecting artisans and labourers’ of the Royal Carriage 
Department, entitled ‘Discipline’, stated: ‘Men are to render implicit obedience to the 
orders of the foremen under whom they are employed. Any act of disobedience or 
insubordination will lead to the immediate suspension of the offender, and in 
aggravated cases to his dismissal’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 561). The further away from a 
military base an armaments factory was located, the greater was the need for discipline 
and military-type authority: ‘There are reasons, I think, why in an outlying place like 
Enfield, where a large departments is set up in the midst of a civilian population, great 
good does arise from having a soldier with habits of discipline as the head of the factory’ 
(BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 3914). 
The next two sections describe and analyse the accounting and workplace practices 
installed at GMMEs between the 1850s and 1880s with the objective of making the 




5. Expert knowledge-based piece rates 
The 1854 fact-finding mission to the United Sates found that, in both government and 
private gun factories, ‘piece-work when applicable is universally preferred to day-work’. 
Impressed by what they saw, the committee ‘respectfully’ advised the Board of 
Ordnance that ‘the system of paying by the piece is that on which … the proposed 
Manufactory of Small Arms [at Enfield Lock], could be best conducted so as to reduce as 
much as possible, the costs of the arms made, and yet pay good wages to workmen 
employed’ (BPP 1854-1855 (0.11), p. 85). The specific reasons given for making this 
recommendation were: 
 It is then in ‘the interest’ of the workers ‘to turn out as many as possible of the article 
they work upon’. 
 The need for supervision is reduced. 
 Workers can be held ‘financially responsible for any work they may spoil through 
carelessness’ (BPP 1854-1855 (0.11), p. 85). 
Piece rate working had also become the principal method of remunerating the 
Woolwich Arsenal’s work-force by 1856 (BPP 1860 (441), p. 654); see also BPP 1862 
(448), p. 186, q. 1576; Hogg, 1963, p. 831), with time-based remuneration restricted in 
the main to ‘foremen, highly skilled mechanics employed in difficult work such as 
pattern and gauge making, and unskilled labourers mainly employed in transporting 
stores and articles to and from the shops’ (Hogg, 1963, p. 833).  
The remainder of this section examines the steps taken to ensure that piece rates 
were fixed at a level designed to ensure that the public obtained good value for 
payments made to the GMMEs workforce. This required piece-rate accounting to be 
transformed from a system designed solely to ensure workers were paid ‘customary 
rates’ (Walsh & Stewart, 1993 p. 785) for pieces they happened to complete into a 
measurement technique that created a calculable person whose achievements were 
made financially knowable. 
 
5.1. Fixing the piece rate 
Although most GMME workers were remunerated by the piece, the day rate 
remained important both for the purpose of remunerating day workers and, as 
explained below, to serve as a benchmark for critically analysing payments made to 
piece workers. War Office staff responsible for compiling a report addressed to the 
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Under-Secretary of State for War, in 1861, insisted that the overriding ‘principle’ was 
that, in fixing the day rate, men’s earnings were ‘regulated according to the market 
value of their labour’ (BPP 1861 (169), p. 3), i.e. GMMEs paid wages equivalent to the 
‘usual rates in private manufacturing establishments’ (BPP 1861 (169), p. 2).  
Fixing the initial piece rate – for example, for the purpose of ‘drilling so many holes in 
a half-inch plate’ or ‘turning a small spindle 3-inches long’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1598) 
– raised the conundrum of goal congruence whereby management aims to keep labour 
costs per unit to a minimum whereas workers seek to maximise earnings. Major General 
F. Close, Superintendent of the Royal Carriage Department, explained the pivotal role of 
the experienced foreman in fixing the piece rate. The foreman was particularly well-
equipped to do that job, according to Close, because he ‘is constantly in the shop, and … 
has been there for many years, and understands almost to a nicety what a man ought to 
get out of the work’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1555, emphasis added; see also q. 1569). 
Another source of knowledge for the purpose of fixing the initial piece rate was to get 
‘things done on day-work at first, so as to give [Close] a better idea of what the piece-
work price should be’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1602, emphasis added). These 
arrangements gave rise to a new type of piece rate which, in terms of scientification, fell 
somewhere between the traditional reliance on custom and practice and the time and 
motion based norms that were a key feature of the Taylor-led Efficiency Movement of 
the early twentieth century. The payment norms constructed for use in GMMEs might 
therefore be described as expert knowledge-based calculations. 
It was claimed that the piece-rate system was beneficial to both parties: workers 
were paid more and the taxpaying public got the job done more cheaply (BPP 1861 
(169), p. 3). A ‘Memorandum on the Piece-work system in operation in the Royal 
Carriage Department’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 605, emphasis added) explained how 
these mutually-beneficial outcomes were achieved: 
The object of piece-work is twofold: - 1st, to ensure a constant and maximum output of 
work in a given time, and, 2nd, to do this at no extra cost, less if possible. 
Thus, if a man, working on his day rating, do [sic] a piece of work in four hours, the 
object of piece-work is to encourage him to finish it in three hours, paying him his 
four hours’ rating as the piece-work price. This practically amounts to getting one-
third greater output in a given time, and, of course, paying the men one-third more 
wages than in day-work. 
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The advantage to the Service is, a greater output of work for the same expenditure of 
power, superintendence, &c., and to the workman, increased wages for greater 
activity. 
As the Manager of the RSAF, James McGee, put it: ‘the machinery will run at the same 
rate’ whether workers work quickly or slowly (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 7707). Therefore, 
using a system of piece-work remuneration to penalise, financially, workers who failed 
to produce the target level of output (i.e. one-third above that of the day worker) was 
intended to economise on overheads and reduced total cost per unit. Behavioural issues 
were also confronted in an age when workers were making the difficult transition from 
the irregular and often seasonal rhythms of activity common within the agricultural and 
domestic spheres to the discipline required for the efficient conduct of factory-based 
production (Rule, 1986, chapter 5). Expressing the challenge in Foucauldian terms: ‘The 
body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to 
imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is 
regarded both as a right and as property’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 10). A memorandum on the 
piece-work system in operation at the Royal Carriage Department focuses on the need, 
nevertheless, for continuous surveillance of the workforce so as to guard against lax 
behaviour: 
To secure the full advantage of working piece-work, the workman must be kept 
constantly in touch with the system, or he will degenerate into performing his work 
in a mere perfunctory manner; he must be made to feel that his earnings depend 
absolutely upon his individual exertions; that if from any cause he fail to earn his 
weekly rating he will not get it, or if he earn double he will equally be paid it (BPP 
1887 (C.5116), p. 605, emphasis added). 
A further challenge to the successful implementation of piece-rate remuneration was 
the temptation for workers to ‘shirk’ on quality. Risk of moral hazard was guarded 
against by making payment conditional on thorough inspection and approval of articles 
manufactured. According to Superintendent Maitland, each article paid for represented 
‘equally good work, because it has to be passed by the viewers under a most rigid 
inspection’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 870).  
The day-to-day operation of the piece-rate system at the RSAF, the Royal Carriage 
Department and the Royal Laboratory, was, technically, a relatively straightforward 
matter because men were employed individually and ‘paid according to the number that 
they turn out’ (BPP 1861 (169), p. 3). The heavy and complex armaments manufactured 
at the Royal Gun Factory often required workers to operate as teams, thereby 
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necessitating measurement of the amount of ‘labour bestowed’ upon a joint task by each 
member of the fellowship (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 5996 and p. 179). The required data 
was ‘ascertained from the muster rolls and returns of attendance, and his proportion of 
the aggregate amount [i.e. value of articles manufactured] is settled according to the 
class of workmen to which he belongs in the rating for day-pay’ (BPP 1861 (169), p. 3).  
The next section reveals that piece rates were continuously monitored and, when 
revised, usually suffered downward adjustment. 
 
5.2. Monitoring and revising the piece rate  
The archives reveal that the performance of workers was the subject of continuous 
examination to judge whether piece rates required revision. For example, after trialling 
the initial piece rate for a month to six weeks, it would be reduced where the accounting 
records revealed that ‘the average men possibly are making considerably over what 
their fellows would be making at other jobs in the same shop, all equally good men’ 
(BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1531, emphasis added; see also q. 1565). And this might happen 
because workers had themselves devised more efficient ways of doing things: ‘when the 
workmen find that their earnings depend on their own labour and ingenuity, they 
discover methods of economising their work … and it is soon found that they earn much 
more than they would by day-pay’ (BPP 1861 (169), p. 3). After early revision, the 
‘piece-work price’ typically remained unchanged for ‘a year or two’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), 
q. 1598, q. 1599), but it was the subject of ongoing review and, for that purpose, the key 
issue was the level of the premium paid to piece workers compared with the day rate.  
The general policy, at the Woolwich Arsenal, was that the piece rate should be set at a 
level which enabled ‘an ordinary fair average’ piece worker to earn around one-third 
more than the day rate (BPP 1887 (C.5116) q. 1532; see also qq. 5335-5337), but a 
‘superior workman would make more than that’ and an ‘indifferent workman would 
make less than one third’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1532). One third was not an invariable 
rule in time or place. At the Royal Gun Factory, in 1861, the expected premium was put 
at one-quarter whereas, in 1887, something between three-eighths and one-half was 
considered a reasonable benchmark (BPP 1861 (169), p. 3; BPP 1887 (C.5116), qq. 531-
532, q. 6415). These differences, although not part of a scientific norm-based 
methodology, were not entirely arbitrary in character. Time and a half was paid at the 
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Gun Factory in 1887 because it was ‘more arduous and more dangerous work, and they 
[the workers] expect more’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 875).  
The amount earned by individual workers would naturally depend on speed of 
performance, and the challenge was to decide whether, and when, an adjustment to the 
piece rate was appropriate. Personnel at different levels within the managerial 
structure were explicitly charged with this responsibility. In the Royal Carriage 
Department, for example, the Assistant Superintendent, Major Ormsby, undertook ‘The 
weekly examination of the men’s piece-work earnings, to remove any errors of excess 
or defect in the pricing of the various operations as they may become apparent’ (BPP 
1887 (C.5116), p. 556). This duty of surveillance reached down through the managerial 
structure with, at shop floor level, the foreman responsible for checking whether piece 
workers’ weekly earnings broadly represented a premium of one-third over the day 
rate. Charles D. Piper, principal clerk in the Royal Carriage Department, stated that if, for 
example, piece-workers earned £3 when they were ‘rated’ for 35s the foreman would 
make an enquiry to find out how this might have happened (BPP 1887 (C.5116), qq. 
5387-5388). £3 compared with 35s. represented an exceptional premium, however, and 
modest increments were not the subject of investigation unless the worker was 
‘constantly earning more than the standard rate’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 5390).  
Although the successful exercise of disciplinary power is designed to create ‘docile 
bodies’ (Foucault, 1991, pp. 135-169), this is not a state of affairs easily reached, and the 
fixing and revision of piece rates was an arena within which GMME workers sought to 
exert influence. Disciplining the labour force in a Foucauldian sense is, of course, a 
completely different process from the ‘vengeance of an outraged law’ central to the 
exercise of sovereign power (Foucault, 1991, p. 179). The desired outcome is instead 
obtained ‘through the mechanics of training’ whereby: ‘Discipline “makes” individuals; 
it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as 
instruments of its exercise’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 170 and p. 179). To get the best out of the 
GMME workforce, a memorandum designed to help make effective piece-rate working 
at the Royal Carriage Department acknowledged the importance of the system’s 
acceptability to both master and servant: ‘The working of the system should be such as 
to establish a mutual confidence, the workman feeling that strict justice alone influences 
the cutting down or raising of prices, and the master being assured that no 
combinations of men exist to keep prices too high’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 606). It is 
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uncertain that management/worker relationships were, however, always as 
harmonious as this assessment implies. 
It is certainly the case that lack of goal congruence led to ‘game-playing’ by each 
faction, both when the initial rate was fixed and thereafter. At ‘the commencement of a 
new piece-work job’, according to Superintendent Close, management had to guard 
against the ‘great inducement to the men to turn out a smaller quantity … so that the 
price for that article may be fixed at rather a higher rate’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1552), 
i.e. the workers had begun, as Hobsbawm (1964, p. 361) put it, to understand ‘the rules 
of the game’. Then, during the life-span of the piece rate, the knowledge that the price 
would be reduced if earnings were deemed by management to be too high caused ‘some 
of the men always, so to speak, keep a little [output] up their sleeve’ (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), q. 873; see also q. 531). An administrative circular warned management to 
suspect collusion where ‘the earnings be uniform in any shop for many weeks in 
succession’, in which case the recommended remedy was ‘at once [to] reduce the prices 
until the men are compelled to work upon their merits, which will be shown by some 
drawing higher wages than others’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 606). Turning to the Royal 
Gun Factory, one of its foremen, Richard Edmonds, agreed that ‘it is very rarely that 
they go over’ the conventional premium  
because they know that we are watching and looking after them; we do not say, ‘You 
must not earn any more,’ but they seem to think this – ‘If we do earn something more, 
we shall probably have our prices taken down’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 6415, 
emphasis added). 
Superintendent Maitland, summed up the situation as follows: ‘they [the workers] 
know very well that after a time the piece work price would be reduced. It is a constant 
match between the Foreman to reduce the prices and those men to prevent their being 
reduced’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 532). In the opinion of Superintendent Close, ‘inasmuch 
as the price is always subject to revision they [the workers] do not benefit in the long 
run’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1552). Management freely admitted that ‘revisions are 
mostly in the direction of lowering the prices’ but this was attributed to the fact that the 
initial price was often set high to ensure workers receive a fair remuneration while they 
got used to a new ‘pattern’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 606). Only exceptionally, it seems, 
would the piece rate be increased as the result of the review process (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), q. 1532, q. 1568; Pam, 1998, p. 103). 
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The accounting procedures employed ‘to codify, regulate and normalise behaviours’ 
(Fúnez, 2005, p. 91) are next examined.  
 
6. Depicting human selves in written form 
The purpose of new ways of accounting introduced at GMMEs from the 1850s 
onwards was to treat the worker as a ‘fragment of mobile space’ who could be 
submitted to various disciplines to maximise his utility in terms of production efficiency 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 164). It will be shown that the GMMEs factory accounts reveal much 
more than payments made to operatives. In addition the accounting records interrogate 
performance: ‘By assigning individual operators to a specific space or place, and by 
accounting for the performance of each operator, a much tighter control over 
performance can be effected’ (Carmona et al., 2002, p. 243).  
Evidence presented to the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Organization and 
Administration of the Manufacturing Departments of the Army – the Morley Committee 
– illuminates the arrangements put in place to enable management to monitor, 
remunerate and discipline the workforce. The starting point for imposing effective 
jurisdiction was the attendance records. These were designed to measure the amounts 
payable to day workers which, as discussed above, provided a benchmark for reviewing 
and revising the piece rate. Time records also fulfilled a key disciplinary role by 
encouraging the regularity of attendance required to achieve efficient factory-based 
production. For this reason, the piece worker, according to the Principal Clerk at the 
Royal Laboratory, was obliged to ‘keep time as regularly as a day work man’ (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), q. 5641, q. 5642). Failure to comply with this requirement resulted in the 
imposition of fines for late or non-attendance (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 5659). Rules and 
regulations setting out the duties and responsibilities of gun factory workers ran to 56 
paragraphs and covered a miscellany of issues relating to attendance, rates of pay, 
overtime (for day workers), sickness, injuries, leave of absence and holidays (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), Appendix IX, pp. 533-53). This required an extensive system of individualised 
record-keeping in the endeavour to construct a more governable worker. 
Hours of work at the Royal Gun Factory, for example, were specified as follows for 
Monday through to Thursday: 6am-8am, 9am-1pm and 2pm-5.30pm. Day shifts on 
Friday amounted to 10 hours and on Saturday to six hours, adding up to the working 
week of 54 hours. The night shift Monday-Friday ran from 5.20pm to 6am, with 
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continuity of production guaranteed by the requirement that ‘men on night-shift [be] 
not allowed to leave work until those who are to take their places for the next shift have 
arrived’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 533). Compliance with these regulations was measured 
by a prominently displayed time-piece which, as at the Royal Tobacco Factory, served to 
help fulfil ‘disciplinary purposes’ (Carmona et al., 2002, p. 243): ‘The clock at the ticket 
office regulates the general attendance. No one is to leave his work until the bell rings’ 
(BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 533).  
Within this temporal structure a system of ticketing was employed to substantiate 
attendance at the workplace. On arrival at the factory the workman deposited a metal 
docket bearing his identity number in the ticket box. Failure to do so resulted in non-
recognition of attendance for wage payment purposes. To accommodate the possibility 
of a number of workmen queuing to deposit their metal tickets, a rather less than 
generous ‘one minute’s grace’ was allowed (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 534). Night workers 
were admitted to the factory provided they arrived no later than ‘10 minutes after the 
proper time’, but would lose one hour’s pay. Anyone depositing the ticket of another 
worker risked immediate dismissal.  
The system of managerial authority and worker subservience is also clarified: 
Workmen are to render implicit and unhesitating obedience to the orders of the 
foreman or others under whom they are employed. They are also to obey the orders 
of the warder. Any act of disobedience or insubordination will lead to the immediate 
suspension of the offender and, in aggravated cases, to his dismissal (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), p. 534).  
Turning to the extensive accounting arrangements required to operate the system of 
piece-rate remuneration which was used as a basis for exercising disciplinary power the 
practices described below focus principally on the Royal Gun Factory where, as noted 
above, fellowship working was the more common practice. The procedures employed 
are explained drawing mainly on evidence presented by Superintendent Maitland, the 
rules and regulations set out in Appendix VIII of the Morley Committee’s report, and the 
70 pro forma accounts and forms reproduced as Appendix IX (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 
601 and pp. 535-551).14 These data reveal major concerns with accountability and 
                                                          
14 The existence of corresponding arrangements in other military establishments is 
indicated by material for the Royal Carriage Department reproduced as: Appendix XIII – 
Division of duties; Appendix XIV – Regulations affecting artisans and labourers; 
Appendix XV – Extracts from departmental orders; Appendix XVI – Outline of the system 
of accounts (BPP 1887 (C.5116), pp. 556-568). 
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control in terms of a determination to ensure payments were made only for goods and 
services actually rendered to the Royal Gun Factory, that the output of each individual 
worker was made clearly visible and that the cost of each product was accurately 
computed. The bare bones of the administrative arrangements put in place for these 
purposes are summarised in the remainder of this section. 
Work mandates received by the Royal Gun Factory from the War Office were given an 
order number and then forwarded to a manager who allocated the job to the foreman 
responsible for its completion. A record of time spent by day workers on each order/job 
was kept by a work-taker and recorded in his account book which was also signed by 
the chief foreman. The build-up of wages paid to a group of day workers in the Steam 
Branch for the week ended 28 November 1885 is reproduced as Fig. 3. It reports, for 
each of them, the hours spent on individual jobs (Gawion and Capon worked during the 
week on the same job – order no. 1014), the rate per hour, and the total labour cost. 
Turning to the accounting arrangements made for remunerating workers by the 
piece, the ‘Piece Work Account’ (Fig. 4) records the name and number of each worker 
and the amount payable for the week ended 16 January 1886.15 It also shows the 
number of hours worked which, when multiplied by the hourly rate, gives the amount a 
worker would have received if remunerated on the day-rate basis.16 This information 
therefore enabled management to assess whether the premium earned was acceptable 
or whether a reduction in the piece rate required consideration. The way in which this 
might be done is described by the Royal Laboratory’s Principal Clerk, W.E.S. Oram: 
‘Every week we get a statement from one shop or another giving the amount of the 
wages earned by piecework, and the wages which the same men would earn by 
daywork, and we are then able to see that the piecework wages are not in excess; … we 
think that a very good check’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 5641). 
The work-takers were also responsible for accurately logging completed pieces of 
work. Piece Work Vouchers (Fig. 5) were used to record work done on a particular 
                                                          
15 The Piece Work Account was signed by the chief foreman and sent to the wages 
branch where it was ‘compared with the total of the piece-work vouchers presented for 
payment on account of work done’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 94). 
16 Dallen actually worked 62 hours but, if remunerated on the time basis, this equated to 
69 hours due, perhaps, to a premium payable for working outside normal hours. Thus 
Dallen’s remuneration on the day-rate basis would have amounted to 69 hours x 8d. = 
£2 6s. 0d. 
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order, such as that on order numbers 9, 13 and 14 during the week ended 28 November 
1885 (Fig. 5, EE). The piece-rate vouchers were signed by the Work-taker (J. Hills), the 
Examiner (H.R.), who confirmed that work was up to the required standard, and, as in 
the case of the Piece Work Account, the Chief Foreman (J. W. Loveridge).  
The Examiner played a key role in infusing discipline within the labour force, with his 
responsibilities explained more fully in evidence detailing the piece-work practices in 
the Royal Carriage Department. According to Superintendent Close, the department 
employed a Chief Examiner and 36 Examiners, ‘all of whom are experienced artizans in 
the timber and iron trades’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1442). These examiners based their 
assessment of the quality of work completed on both observation and physical 
measurement, with the need for great accuracy driven by the requirement for carriage 
components to be fully interchangeable: 
As we have at the present time very complicated machines for the movement of the 
heaviest guns as well as the lightest, extremely good engine-fitting work is required, 
and therefore the difficulty of securing the interchangeability of parts is greatly 
enhanced. As a matter of fact our ordinary workmen work to the 1/000th of an inch. 
That is the working limit (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1464).  
Examiners were provided with gauges to enable them to check whether the required 
parameters were met, and their ‘sense of responsibility’ was ‘sharpened by the 
necessity of stamping with their identifying mark all work passed by them’ (BPP 1887 
(C.5116), q. 1442). Application of the stamp therefore supplied the audit trail linking the 
examiner with each completed piece of work. Where the level of rejections was of a 
‘serious nature’ the offending workman was reported to the superintendent to decide 
what disciplinary action was required (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1442). For minor offences, 
the Assistant Superintendent had the power to fix the penalty, e.g. suspension. 
Returning to the Royal Gun Factory, the data recorded on piece-work vouchers were 
summarised in a ‘Piecework Account’ (Fig. 5, FF) after checking that the rates shown on 
the vouchers were in line with the prices authorised for that particular type of work. 
Using the above primary documentation, the amounts earned by day workers and piece 
workers each week were then recorded in the wages summary which revealed the 
amounts paid in respect of each job to workers in the various departments of the Royal 
Gun Factory (Fig. 6). It can be seen that the amount paid under order no. 13 (£1 17s. 6d. 
from Fig. 5) for work in the Field Gun Section (F.G.S) appears in column 2. Wages paid to 
both day and piece workers were then summarised, for each month and each job, in a 
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Wages Abstract and, from there, transferred to the relevant account in the cost ledger. 
This double entry-based ledger account showing the accumulated cost of a ‘B[reech]. 
L[oading]., 4-Inch, 22 cwt.’ gun, including also material and indirect costs, is reproduced 
as Fig. 7. 
The history presented above reveals no evidence of the use by GMMEs of 
scientifically established labour standards based on time-and-motion studies as was the 
case at the US Springfield Armory and which became a key feature of the scientific 
management era in Britain in the early twentieth century. However, it does disclose the 
existence of workplace practices designed to make the workforce visible and 
manageable by: (a) analysing manufacturing processes into their constituent elements; 
(b) paying for work by the piece based on the conviction that this method of worker 
remuneration best achieved labour efficiency; (c) fixing the piece rate by drawing on 
expert knowledge of achievable output; (d) continuously reviewed the validity of the 
piece rate in two different ways – first by comparisons with the day rate; second 
through benchmarking rates paid in the private sector; and (e) operating a detailed 
system of record keeping to ensure accurate records of attendance and of day-rate and 
piece-rate remuneration. The examination of performance therefore entailed a ‘whole 
apparatus of writing’ to supply the ‘disciplinary methods’ that created a ‘describable 
individuality [of each GMME worker] and made of this description a means of control 
and a method of domination’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 190, p. 191). 
Underpinning these arrangements are ideas central to Foucault’s (1991, p. 177, p. 
180) concept of ‘gratification-punishment’, where the purpose of that ‘double system’ is 
to serve as a corrective device. At Britain’s GMMEs, piece rate arrangements functioned 
as an everyday apparatus designed to fulfil that dual role. The dedicated piece rate 
worker was rewarded for producing more items than would have been the case if 
remunerated on the time basis whereas the lazy or inefficient worker suffered 
punishment through lower wages. The assumption was that GMME workers would be 
expected to cooperate in their own subjection as they would believe, based on 
observation of how they and their colleagues were treated, that working harder was the 
best course of action for them to follow, i.e. they would become ‘docile bodies’ that 
functioned as their own disciplinarian (see Foucault, 1991, chapter 2).  
We saw in section 5 that the desire for ‘fair’ treatment of the workforce featured 
prominently in the rhetoric surrounding the discussion of day rates and piece rates, and 
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this might well have been a genuine concern. In the absence of corroborating testimony 
provided by ‘voices from below’ (Napier, 2006, p. 459), however, it is probably wise to 
retain a degree of suspicion that GMME’s managers aimed to impose minimum, rather 
than fair, rates of remuneration on the workforce. Consistent with this idea, the next 
section reveals incontrovertible evidence that the pursuit of productive efficiency 
sometimes had serious negative consequences for the economic and social conditions of 
workers and their families. 
 
7. Cost-cutting, efficiency and economy 
In a House of Commons debate during the Spring of 1893 the Secretary of State for 
War, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, insisted that ‘the Government should show 
themselves to be amongst the best employers of the country, that they should be, if I 
may use the phrase, in the first flight of employers’ (Hansard, 6 March 1893, vol. 9, col. 
1129). But Campbell-Bannerman did not intend to imply that the government should 
not aim to get value for money. While acknowledging the fact that, unlike the private 
sector, ‘we are not bound to make a profit’, he insisted that the government was ‘subject 
to another influence and consideration, I may well say, to take the place of eagerness to 
make a profit’, namely ‘that we are dealing – not with our own money, but with other 
people’s [the taxpayers’] money’ (Hansard, 6 March 1893, vol. 9, col. 1130). 
The evidence presented in this paper reveals that, as the century progressed, the 
affairs of GMMEs witnessed a growing emphasis on the pursuit of the entrepreneurial 
ideal of ‘cheap and efficient government’ (Perkin, 1969, p. 320; see also p. 379) with, at 
the end-date of this study, the terms of reference given to the Morley Committee making 
it clear that ‘the inquiry should be limited to the question whether any, and what, 
improvements can be suggested, with a view to greater efficiency and economy’ (BPP 
1887 (C.5116), p. iii). GMMEs strove, from the 1850s onwards, to gain a firm control 
over costs in the endeavour to legitimise their role as least-cost suppliers of military 
weapons, and the widespread adoption of piece-rate remuneration contributed to this 
objective. Piece working also avoided burdening the department with a ‘fixed 
establishment of workmen’ for which it had no remunerative work (BPP 1861 (169) p. 
3): workers were summarily sacked when no longer required (BPP 1861 (169) p. 3). 
There are other examples of ways in which management’s determination to drive down 
manufacturing costs increased the financial pressure on workers and their families. 
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Changes in manufacturing methods sometimes had major economic and social 
implications for the workforce. In July 1855, for example, notice was served on all 
existing employees at the RSAF because the ‘skill and experience required for hand 
processes had been much reduced’ by the introduction of the assembly-line production 
techniques (Pam, 1998, pp. 56-57). Some were re-engaged ‘on altered terms’ but, of the 
others, only those with ‘long and faithful service’ were awarded gratuities (Pam, 1998, 
p. 57). In 1871 the decision was taken to manufacture the Martini Henry rifle. Little 
work was available during the ensuing ‘upheaval’, with the men ‘unable to earn more 
than a few shillings a week’ and, in some cases, ‘forced to run up crippling debts in local 
shops’ (Pam, 1998, p. 74, p. 75). Two years later, men were discharged and pensioned 
off in large numbers as the result of further mechanisation of weapon-making facilities 
(Pam, 1998, p. 80; see also p. 94, p. 95 and pp. 100-101). 
The effect on the piece rate of increased mechanisation and consequential deskilling 
of the labour force is the subject of a series of reports prepared for the Director of 
Artillery by the Superintendent of the RSAF. The piece rates paid to workers engaged to 
manufacture the Martini Henry rifle during each of the six years from 1871-1872 to 
1876-1877 are set out in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Piece rates Martini Henry rifle (National Archives). 
Year    Piece rate 
 £ s. d. 
1871-1872 1 13   7  
1872-1873 1 8   9 
1873-1874 1 3   3 
1874-1875  18   9¼ 
1875-1876  16   0½  
1876-1877  14   4 
 
The reduction in the piece rate of 4s. 10d. (14.4%) in 1872-1873 was achieved 
because management ‘substituted finishing machines for hand labour, thereby 
obtaining greater rapidity of production’. The further fall in the piece rate to £1 3s. 3d. in 
1873-1874 was attributed to the use, in the finishing process, ‘of machines and 
unskilled cheap labour, in the room of hand-work and high wages’. The much greater 
precision resulting from additional mechanisation meant that most of the rifles could 
‘now be assembled from the machines without other manual labour or adjustment than 
that required to simply put the parts together’. Further planned changes to production 
methods were intended to enable management to reduce costs by dispensing ‘with the 
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services of highly paid men for good and all’, and Table 2 reveals that these expectations 
were fulfilled. By 1876-1877 the piece rate was less than half the level of just five years 
earlier.17  
The workforce also suffered hardship when threats of war receded. The RSAF was a 
source of ‘full and steady employment’ for the ten years following the ending of the 
Crimean War (1854-1856), but was then run down with employees encouraged to leave 
through, for example, the offer of free passage to Canada (Pam, 1998, p. 74). Another 
reduction in manufacturing activity, in 1876, caused a large number of artisans and 
labourers to be discharged. Even where gratuities were awarded, these were often 
lower than expected because of swingeing deductions made for time lost due to no fault 
on the part of the worker, e.g. because men were temporarily laid off to enable greater 
mechanisation of the production process or were absent due to sickness (Pam, 1998, p. 
81). In one case, an employee who had been unwell for three weeks was penalised a 
year’s service (Gazette 13 May, 1876, quoted in Pam, 1998, p. 81).  
 
8. Discussion and concluding remarks 
A number of different methods have been used, through the ages, to remunerate 
Britain’s workers. Time-based payments have been a feature throughout, with direct 
supervision relied upon to help maximise worker productivity where that was a 
priority. Payment by the piece was a natural and convenient method of remuneration 
under the domestic system and one also used when workers assembled to undertake 
factory-based production. The history of labour arrangements indicates, initially, no 
major concern to ensure maximum productivity, with personnel reimbursed for the 
number of pieces they happened to complete and the amount paid based on custom and 
practice. As management became more interested in maximising productivity, e.g. to 
make better use of expensive capital equipment, steps were taken to achieve intensive 
as opposed to extensive utilisation of the labour force. In this transition, the 
construction of piece rates which measured more precisely the amount paid to workers 
played a key role. The rise of scientific management ‘at the turn of the [nineteenth] 
century … attempted to [further] increase the efficiency of workers by determining and 
setting work standards for as many aspects of the worker’s task as possible’ based on 
                                                          
17 It should be noted that the Rousseaux overall price indices for 1800-1913 to have 
fallen from 128 to 110 between 1872 and 1877 (Mitchell, 1988, p. 723). 
34 
 
time and motion studies (Young & Davis, 1990, p. 89). Against this background, the 
present paper broadens our understanding of the history of ways of managing and 
remunerating the workforce by studying arrangements put in place at a site largely 
overlooked by accounting historians, i.e. the GMMEs of Victorian Britain.  
The historical evidence presented in this study reveals that workplace practices fashioned by 
GMME managers were designed to supply a new mode of discipline, theorised by Foucault 
(1991), through surveillance, correction, and training within an enclosed factory space. The 
precise steps taken to improve the visibility of the GMMEs workforce was both architectural and 
documentary. The RSAF imported to Britain the ‘American system of manufacturing’ in the late 
1850s, and this involved, for the first time, the operation of the assembly-line technique with 
jobs broken down into their constituent parts. The construction and design of the RSAF’s 
machine shop (Fig. 1) was intended to improve management surveillance of employees going 
about their new work, but it is the use of new ways of record keeping to measure the ‘activity of 
the men, their skill, the way they set about their tasks, their promptness, their zeal, their 
behaviour’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 174) which is the main focus of this paper.  
Management’s preoccupation with economy and efficiency was stressed time and 
again in evidence presented to the Morley Committee, with actions taken to impose 
rigorous labour practices on the GMME workforce summarised as follows by the 
Superintendent of the Royal Gunpowder Factory (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 7093):  
Great care in selection of suitable workmen as regards age, intelligence, and stamina. 
Judicious weeding out of the inefficient and retention of only thoroughly capable and 
trustworthy hands. … Care in so adapting the manual labour to the producing power 
of the machinery, that the out-turn may be a maximum. This is attained by a judicious 
arrangement of the working hours. 
These priorities were partly achieved through the operation of a system of record 
keeping which went beyond tracking rights and obligations so as to measure, discipline 
and transform behaviour within the workplace. For example, the ‘documentary 
techniques’ put in place to record attendance supplied the power-knowledge required 
to objectify and dominate workers through a system of penalties designed to fulfil an 
‘essentially corrective’ role (Foucault, 1991, p. 179, p. 191). In a similar vein, the expert 
knowledge-based piece rates supplied the ‘penal accountancy’ required to construct ‘the 
punitive balance-sheet of each individual’ and, thereby, the level of financial reward 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 180). In these and other ways the disciplinary power provided by 
hierarchical observation through accounting records made GMME workers ‘clearly 
visible’ so that that they could be known and altered (Foucault, 1991, p. 171) 
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We have uncovered no evidence to suggest that piece rates were based on scientific, 
norm-based, time and motion studies nor, therefore, that performance was measured in 
terms of deviations from scientifically computed norms as became the practice during 
the scientific management era. On the other hand, when fixing the piece rate in GMMEs, 
management was not the passive acceptance of traditional tariffs which was the 
hallmark of earlier workplace practices. Instead, in the words of Superintendent 
General F. Close, piece rates were based on what an experienced foreman believed ‘a 
man ought to get out of the work’ (BPP 1887 (C.5116), q. 1555, emphasis added). We 
therefore conclude that serious efforts were made to set rates at a level designed to 
achieve effective control over labour costs and, thereby to help construct an embryonic 
‘governable worker’. To achieve this objective, this study has revealed the existence of: 
1. detailed regulations designed to ensure that workers understood their employment 
obligations, which included the duty to attend the factory during specified time 
periods and to obey, without question, orders from their superiors; 
2. a system of time records capable of tracking, accurately, attendance at the 
workplace with significant penalties imposed for failure to comply with this 
disciplinary obligation; 
3. a scheme of accounting which went beyond a record of physical flows to express the 
value of work done, in financial terms, that could be compared with the expected 
output of a day worker.  
The GMME system of expert knowledge-based piece-rates, like standard costing 
some decades later, therefore ‘made possible a new form of government of persons 
within the firm’ (Miller & O’Leary, 1994, p. 99) and should be viewed as a ‘technology’ 
designed to fashion ‘individuals, entities and activities in conformity with a particular 
set of ideals’ (Miller & O’Leary, 1994, p. 99) which, for successive governments in 
nineteenth-century Britain, was improved efficiency and economy. The objective was, 
therefore, the construction of a system of authority and dominance capable of ensuring 
maximum output. But this did not produce a situation where workers were entirely 
subjugated to the willpower of management, and it unlikely that the workforce, then or 
much later, was ever reduced to entirely robotic behaviour. When setting piece rates at 
GMMEs, the ‘rules of the game’ (Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 361) saw workers engage in game-




The findings presented in this paper support the case for accounting historians 
extending their study of the available archives to achieve a richer and deeper 
understanding of the constitutive role played by accounting in the quest, through time, 
for management control over labour. The present paper contributes to that endeavour 
by showing how managers at Britain’s GMMEs – a site neglected by accounting 
historians – devised a scheme of human accountability which, as in the case of standard 
costing some years later, involved ‘the elaboration of a range of techniques for the 
supervision, administration and disciplining of a population of human individuals’ 
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Fig. 1. Royal Small Arms Factory machine shop (Matthews, 2000). Copyright on this 
image is owned by Christine Matthews and is licensed for reuse under the Creative 





Fig. 2. ‘Large room’ at the royal small arms factory in 1861 (Illustrated London News, 





























Fig. 7. Extract from cost ledger (BPP 1887 (C.5116), p. 542). 
 
 
